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ABSTRACT 
In rhis paper we propose an inregrarion of cognirive linguistic and cognirive anthropology models. The 
k q  concepf around rhe integrarion revolves is rhar of 'culrural cognirion', manifesred in rhe inrersubjecrive 
caregories andconceprs rhar make up so-called 'culrural models ' in language, rhoughf, affecr andacrion, whose 
main funcrions include: ro represenr schematized versions of rhe world and experience; ro help inrerprer novel 
symbolic experience; 10 encode and express inrersubjecrive experience; and ro synchronize, direct and morivare 
social acrion. 
In rhe first secrions of rhe paper, we describe rhe rheorerical underpinnings of rhe cognirive-culrural 
model; and in rhe lasr secrion we offer a sample programmaric applicarion of rhe model ro a possible 
(cross)cuirurai d i c r i o ~ r y  enrry of 'Worid' and 'Self'. 
KEY WORDS: cognitive linguistics; cognitive anthropology; cultural cognition; cultural model. 
RESUMEN 
En esre rrabajo proponemos una inregración de modelos lingüísrico-cognirivos y cognirivo- 
anrropológicos. El concepro cenrral sobre el que gira dicha inregración es el de 'cognición culrural', que se 
manifiesra en las caregon'as y conceptos inrersubjetivas que conforman los llamados 'modelos culrurales' en 
lenguaje, pensarnienro, emociones y acción, y cuyas funciones incluyen: repesentar las versiones esquemarizadas 
del mundo y de la experiencia; contribuir a la interpretación de experiencia simbólica nueva; codificar y 
expresar ; y sincronizar, dirigir y motivar la acción social. 
En las primeras secciones del trabajo, se describe el modelo cognitivo-culrural, y en la úlrima sección 
se ofrece una muesrra de aplicación programática a U M  posible entrada de diccionario cultural sobre 'Mundo 
i. Yo/Persona'. 
PALABRAS CLAVE: lingüística cognitiva; antropología cognitiva; cognición cultural; modelo cultural. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Since the rnid-seventies, it has become increasingly clear that, in order to account for 
word-meaning or word-use, linguists rnust recognize the need for incorporating cornrnon 
intersubjective assumptions (world- and culture-knowledge) to their theoretical constmcts. 
From this period dates the move frorn classical, checklist-based theories of meaning to 
prototype-based and frame semantics-based models of rneaning (see especially the seminal 
anicle by Fillmore, 1975), which developed the idea of prototypical categories and scenarios, 
scripts or frarnes relating series of entities or events to properties and attributes thereof in 
a kind of simplified (ie. schematized) version of the world. Thus, to use Fillmore's well- 
known exarnple, a 'bachelor' is not just "an unrnarried male", a definition which would 
encompass not only ordinary males but also male adolescents, celibate priests, the Pope, or 
even certain men with disabling pathologies, etc. But of course language users know full well 
that the latter instantes do not commonly fa11 within the referential scope of the word 
'bachelor' because its denotational referent range normally (a) includes only male persons 
who stay unmarried beyond the usual age thought to be normal for marrying (in a given 
society). while (b) excluding rnale persons who have made special vows of celibacy due to 
religious reasons, or who, by nature, nurture or accident, become somehow handicapped to 
get married or lead a "normal" married life. 
This culture-bound view of lexical meaning soon incorporated what G. Lakoff has 
temed "the generalization and cognitive commitrnents" (1990), namely (a) to characterize 
the general principies goveming al1 aspects of human language (categories, constmctions. 
inferences, semantic relations, metaphorization, implicatures, discourse. understanding, etc); 
and (b) to make accounts of human language accord with what we know about the mind and 
the brain (memory, imagery, conceptualization, perception, ernbodiment, schemas, etc). In 
this way, Frame Semantics and Cognitive Linguistics have provided a frarnework of concepts 
and insights that has proven extremely useful in furthering the cause of comprehensive 
accounts of meaning, beyond purely stmctural, taxonomic, and objectivist accounts (Johnson: 
1993). 
In a parallel fashion, many cultural anthropologists expressed early on their 
dissatisfaction with traditional ethnosemantic approaches of meaning analysis. They argued 
that componential analysis left out of lexical sets relevant information about what speakers 
have to know in order to use a word or a terminological system (eg. kinship terms) 
appropriately. Today most current athropolinguistic accounts of meaning accept the premise 
that the distinction between word-knowledge and world-knowledge is extremely fuzzy, and 
that often a simple word encodes an implicit world of culture-bound assumptions. More 
particularly, they argue that word-knowledge and use presume so-called 'folk cultural 
models' which capture cornrnon intersujective meanings (D'Andrade, 1989). This cognitive 
anthropolinguistic view of meaning has rnade it posssible to bring into a closer relationship 
disciplines and fields that up to now had remained only loosely comected: cognitive science, 
cognitive linguistics, symbolic anthropology, cultural anthropology and cultural cognition 
(D' Andrade, 1995; Stiegler et al., 1990; Taylor and MacLaury , 1995). The implications 
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following from this newfound partnership have, as a corollary, thrown into question a 
number of classical methodological dichotomic separations: word-knowledge and world- 
knowledge (or semantic cognition and cultural cognition); dictionary and encyclopedia; 
structural lexicon and mental lexicon, etc. As a result, language, cognition and culture are 
studied as closely interwoven systems of knowledge (both declarative and procedural). The 
implications of this view boil down to a set of integrated assumptions and insights: (1) that 
culture consists of shared systems of meaning and knowledge (the culture-as-knowledge 
view); (2) that the study of such meaning systems entails the integration of thought, talk. 
emotion and action models; and that (3) the notion of 'cultural cognition' may be seen as the 
encapsulating notion integrating cognitive-cultural meaning systems (Holland and Quim, 
1987). 
11. THE STRUCTURE OF CULTURAL MEANING SYSTEMS 
The culture-as-knowledge assumption entails a view of symbolic beaviour stressing 
the constructionist and constitutive nature of the structures and processes of meaning systems 
(Grace, 1987; Shore, 1990; Searle, 1995). Cultural meaning systems get "packaged" into 
intersubjective schemas (or: 'cultural models in language and thought'), made up of 
constitutive rules (ie. : " X counts as Y for Z"), with associated prototypical scripts, scenarios 
or frames, whose main functions are: 
- to represent the worldlenvironment 
- to help interpret the worldlenvironrnent 
- to direct and orient actions 
- to cause systems of affect and emotion 
- to regulate interpersonal action 
- to help create new meanings 
From this standpoint, a culture is a complex web of cultural meaning systems which provide 
its members with schematized versions of the world, motivational forces, belief-systems, 
evokrnent potentials, institutional orientations, etc. In the words of D'Andrade (1989): 
The meanings of lexical items or vocabulary presuppose schematically 
simplified worlds: procedural devices used to make an interpretation of what, 
under certain conditions, counts as X (eg. a lie, a fit of anger, a mamage, a 
success) ... A cultural schema is not just a network of propositions or an 
imagistic thought. It is an interconnected pattem of interpretive elements. It 
requires a mental object with an addressable memory, priming effects, 
prototypical effects . . . A schema, in turn, may be a trigger for action, volition 
and affect. It interprets and orients action, belief and emotion: what is 
desirable, avoidable, normative. 
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111. TOWARDS AN INTEGRATED CULTURAL-COGNITIVE MODEL 
The ideal cultural cognitive model should seek to relate system-based notions of 
meaning to psychological and phenomenological (subject-centred) accounts, explaining how 
the historically-opaque arbitrariness of sign-formation can be experienced subjectively as a 
naturally transparent, motivational significance and agentive force (Martín Morillas, 1993). 
This account must also incorporate the ontogenesis of meaning consistent with developmental 
psychology (early- and adult- symbol-formation structures and processes). At the same time 
that the model grants the historical and local "grounding" of meaning-construction and 
comprehension (hence its relativity, conventionality and vanability), it should acknowledpe 
its permeability and commensurability. One dimension that this model seeks to incorporate 
to the more traditional distinction between conceptual and affective meaning components. is 
the experiential-sensorial as well as the "existential depth" (explicit, logical, axiological plus 
unconscious, implicit texture). From a cognitive point of view, the concept of cognition that 
is explicitly assumed entails a shift from formalist, feature-based theories of cognitive 
semantics to prototype and categonsation-based models, but extending the laner to 
incorporate aspects of social cognition, social cognition models and cultural psychology 
concepts, as well as vygotskyan and neowhorfian models of language thought and culture. 
Thus, the implication is that an understanding of human cognitive systems cannot lirnit itself 
to the specification of structures and processes of knowledge representation following a 
computationally-based "methodological solipsism" model (Fodor, 1975), but rather should 
seek to embed the representational schemas in socio-cultural schemes and models including 
non-computational and non-representational models. 
In order to develop a coherent integrated model serving as a general framework for 
the investigation of cultural-semantic systems, it may be convenient to isolate key areas of 
research. Below are listed some of the most relevant ones: 
a) Cognitive-semantic studies emphasising the types of schemata and conceptualisations which 
underlie culture-bound practices. Here a number of areas or research can be mentioned: 
(i) image-schemata involving sensorial, polysensorial, synesthetic, synergistic 
concepts and categones; 
(ii) metaphoric and metonymic mappings of cognitive, affective, praxis domains; 
(iii) mental representation of scripts and frames; 
(iv) folk cultural models (culture-bound "philosophies of experience"), ideologies, 
lifestyle, social myths); 
(v) embodiments (rituals, rites of passage, institutional practices). 
b) Social cognition and ethnography of speaking studies focussing on notions such as: 
communicative styles as a result of socialization practices; social categorisation models based 
on attribution theory and intergroup communication (eg. in-group and out-group identity; 
ethnic and gender stereotyping, etc. (Clancy, 1986; Gudykunst, 1989). 
c) Cultural Psychology studies emphasizing the axiological differences between individualistic 
and collective orientation systems and their irnpingement on subjective and intersujective 
values, anitudes and norms (Triandis, 1990), such as the following: 
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- Universal vs localized aspects of human behaviour: psychic unity of mankind (in the 
Eniightenment or Romantic strands) vs relativistic, whorfian differences; 
- Subjective culture vs Intersubjective culture; 
- Leaming style and cognitive styles; 
- Affective and orientation style (eg. individualistic, self-seeking vs group harrnony 
concepts; task-centredness vs human heartedness orientations) 
d) Cultural Semiotic studies, whose basic notions concern aspects of the production and 
consumption of cultural symbols; spheres of knowledge as interest (art, science, morality. 
entertainment) as well as the ideological aspects of high and low culture (Bourdieu, 1990). 
Many examples could be given of concepts and domains illustrating the above notions. 
Here we will mention a few ones for the sake of exemplification: synesthesia in bio-sensorial 
percepts (smell/odor); irnage-schemata of experiential-abstract t e m s  (el marlla mar; der 
Todlla muertelDeath); metaphoric and metonymic mappings of functional locus of self 
(soul/mindlheart- Seele- Dusa); alma/mente/corazón); cultural models of emotion tems 
(anger as heating of fluid in container; love as a journey); disourse metaphors (war 
metaphors in business discourse); folk philosophies ("  senequismo" ; " Schmah" ; " kimochi "); 
socio-cultural gendered models (caballerosidadlmachismo); social ideologies/myths (the 
Arnerican dream of success and achievement); cultural semiotics (bodylself-image and mental 
hygiene in advertisement); heteroglossia and self-constmction (metaphors in self-technologies 
and self-help morality of psychotherapy discourse); axiological concepts and value systems 
in individualist and collectivist societies and groups ("familism"1philotimo); stereotyping in 
genderized talk; embodiement of non-verbal hierarchical signalling, etc. 
These examples help to illustrate the consideration of linguistic meaning closely 
connected to the notion of 'cultural cognition', understood as a people's systemic network 
of schematized intersubjective mental representations embedded in their cultural practices as 
well as the cultural knowledge grounded in experience and cognition and serving as a guide 
for action and interpretation of experience (Shore, 1995). This view of meaning, cognition 
and culture, entails placing culture in the mind and placing mind in the social habitat; that 
is to say: understanding the nexus linking specific minds to particular cultural symbols 
underlying cultural practices. Cognitive-cultural schemata thus synthesise how individuals 
appropriate intersubjectively symbols from experience to consciousness to action. In this 
manner, culture is seen as a system of cognitive models or schemata which govern social 
activities and practices (especially language interaction); these models, in turn are derived 
from those activities and practices to serve as the mental representations encapsulating the 
subjective and intersubjective schematizations. 
To sum up so far, we have been arguing for an integrated cultural-cognitive model 
of language, thought, affect and action, vith a view towards going not oniy beyond the 
objectivist, logical-structural view of meaning (by incorporating phenomenological and 
experiential accounts of meaning-construction structures and processes), but also beyond 
those solipsistic accounts of meaning that tend to gloss over the intersubjective aspects of 
meaning-construction processes. We have likewise highlighted the functions of such 
intersubjective meaning systems, namely: to synchronise and coordinate the creative aspects 
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of cognition and social practice; to supply the possibility of sharing cornrnon orientations in 
terms of belief-systerns, scenarios, scripts, social dramas, myths; to help subjects and groups 
re-appropriate in a novel and idiosyncratic fashion shared models (eg advertising, poetry); 
to re-utilise sensori-motor experience as a means of social symbolisation through metaphoric 
signification patterns involving rituals, routines, social micropractices (rites of passage, 
artistic expression, institutional practices). In the next section we sketch the outlines of an 
application of the model. 
IV. A PROGRAMMATIC APPLICATION OF THE CULTURAL COGNITION MODEL 
Lack of space forbids a detailed analysis of possible applications of the cognitive- 
cultural rnodel set out above. Instead, we will just spell out (rather than flesh out) the general 
outlines of a specific proposal of application, namely a sarnple of a (cross)cultural dictionary 
entry. The entry we have in rnind, which is broken down into AIM, HEURISTIC 
QUESTIONS, and DOMAINS, may be itemised as follows: 
A) AIM: To build an 'emic' model of underlying cognitive structures from empirical 
facts, using a society's own categorial systems in order to describe the cognitive principles 
by which the society's rnembers apprehend and describe the categories of World and Self. 
B) MAIN HEURISTIC QUESTIONS: 
a) Which aspects of the world are saliently important for the culture? 
b) What labels are given for them? 
C )  How is subjective, intersubjective experience classified? 
d) How do people think about and talk about these experiences? 
e) How do talk, thinking, acting, feeling, relate to each other and to the overall axiological- 
cultural sy stern of values, mores, customs, rituals, embodiments, etc .? 
f) What does the way a culture "talla" about its rnembers and the environment te11 us about 
the way it "thinks" about them, that is, the way it typically cognizes and categorizes 
experience of World and Self? 
C) DOMAINS INVOLVED: 
a) Categorization and Prototification of Natural and Non-Natural Concepts: 
Phenomenologically speaking, the world/environment consists of a virtually infinite 
number of discriminably different stimuli and objects. An essential cognitive-cultural activity 
is the parcelling-out of the world/environrnent into categories and prototypes, taxonomies and 
domains. Many non-identical stimuli can be treated as equivalent. Typically, universal 
principles involve: foca1 points, saliency, codability, prototypes (e.g colors). On the other 
hand, culture-bound specifics involve: elaboration of language categories organized into fields 
and domains with superordinate and subordinate categories; category boundaries rnay be 
fuzzy and blended. Categorization for Natural Categories (eg. 'colours') is served by the 
constructivist creation of image schemata, metaphoric and metonymic mappings, prototypes, 
reflecting in a whorfian fashion an ontology of first-, second-, third- order properties and 
relations, as well as superordinate and subordinate features and attributes. A general principal 
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for non-natural categories is Searle's pnnciple of constituted categories: "X counts as Y for 
Z" (eg. 'marriage'). 
b) Categorization of Emotions (Prototypical Scripts, Scenarios, and Conceptual Mappings): 
Most cultures recognize at least six basic human emotions (happiness, anger, sadness, 
fear, surprise, disgust) each associated with a culture-specific set of somatic-affective 
expressive correspondences as well as systems of encoding and interpretation schemas. 
scripts, scenarios and scnpts (Wierzbicka, 1992). Specific cultural infonnation is needed to 
account for differences in metaphoric mappings, prototypical scenarios and scripts and their 
attendant ontological, epistemological and axiological assumptions (Kovecses, 1995 ; Matsuki. 
1995). 
c) Cognitive-Cultural Model of SelfIPerson: 
Al1 cultures encode their awareness of individuality, ie what the individual perceives 
as the boundaries between the self and the world, as well as the self and other selves, the 
individual and the collective (the 'us' and 'them'). The manifestation of this categorization 
is likely to be a specific view on the relationship between the demands of private life and 
those of social commitments. From this confiict may stem attitudes and concepts toward: 
relationships, bonding, courting, pnvacy, altruistic behaviours, entitlements, commitments, 
etc. These in turn may shape the manifestation of such values as: solidarity, individuality, 
membership-acceptance, empathetic ntuals and attitudes, etc. 
The cognitive-cultural model of self is for the most part culture-bound. For instance, 
the Western Conception of Person, according to C. Geertz (1983). is that of a bounded, 
- unique, integrated entity, motivationally and cognitively; a dynamic center of awareness, 
emotion and judgement organized into a distinctive whole and set contrastively both against 
other such wholes and against its social and natural background. The concept of self or 
personhood is socio-culturally mediated and socio-culturally constructed. This means that 
people constmct their own and others' sense of self by relying on public resources, as well 
as on private experiences for self-construction. The concept of self of a given culture is an 
integral part of the cultural model of person of that culture. It includes the irnage-schemata, 
metaphoric and metonymic mappings, and script-like infonnation with which a culture 
schematizes cognitive-culturally its members (witness expressions such as: "slhe has a screw 
loose"; "slhe is a cheek"; "slhe is out of hislher mind"; "slhe feels down"; "slhe has magic"; 
" "slhe has a soft heart"; "a man is known by the company he keeps"; "the face is the mirror 
of the soul", etc.; Martín Morillas, in press). It is, by definition, an intersubjective concept 
included in the cultural models of that culture, and hence in the cultural meaning systems that 
permeate it. The concept of self may be more or less explicit or implicit, conscious or 
subconscious, but it nevertheless manifests itself linguistically in complex and subtle ways: 
lexically, grarnmatically, semantically, pragmatically, discursively (ie. in simple or complex 
lexemes, word-fonnation processes, idioms, proverbs, ways of talking, discourse patterns, 
etc.) 
d) Axiological Models (Values, Orientations, Motives, Beliefs, Ideologies): 
Along the individualism-collectivism dimension a nurnber of categories can be placed: 
private and public spheres; in-group and out-group taxonomies; concern with self, 
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achievement, self-esteem; work ethic; health and sickness; self vs group; self vs others 
(identity, equity, equality, difference, divergence). Axiological-orientational systmes having 
motivational and directive force are deeply involved in such catagories, as are value-laden 
concepts like power, justice, fairness, cooperation, competition, rewards, sanctions, etc.). 
Likewise, many of these axiological categories are liable to a stereotyping categorization, 
which generally betray a number of psycho-social tendencies (illusory correlation, essentialist 
logic, rigid cognitive style, etc.; see Hilton and von Hippel, 1996). Gender, Ethnic, Self and 
other stereotypes provide a fertile ground for the study of how subjective and intersubjective 
mental and cultural models interact. 
Since the above categories belong to general and specific semantic domains 
(constellations and fields), they are liable to onomasiological meaning analyses (in terms of 
dimensions, parameters and features; see Martín Mingorance (1990), for a prograrnmatic 
proposal developed in full by the Functional-Lexematic school), but it can be argued that a 
cognitive-cultural perspective integrating domains of analysis as well as specific constructs, 
methods and hypotheses from cognitive linguistic and cultural anthropolinguistic models may 
offer more encompassing insights for a proper understanding of the oftentimes seamless 
relationship of language to thought, affect and action. 
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Cognitive Anthropolinguistics, in the wake of far-reaching cognitive-semantic 
developments in the '70's, has emphasized the fact that understanding the meaning of a term 
entails understanding the implicit 'cognitive-cultural models' underlying it. A cognitive- 
cultural model works as a sor[ of intersubjectively-shared "simplified", "schematic" version 
of experience in the world. Cognitive-cultural models typically encode in a propositional plus 
motivational format al1 the information members of a culture possess that enables them to 
coordinate, interpret, and orient, their actions, beliefs, values, norms, etc. For cognitive 
anthropologists, terms like 'marriage' 'anger' 'lie' 'smart', 'self etc. are al1 'constituted 
signs', and as such encapsulate a great deal of cultural information and locally-grounded 
knowledge. Of course the representation of the cultural meanings of such constituted signs 
cannot rely exclusively on declarative- propositional schemas or frarnes, for they must also 
incorporate procedural and non-representationa aspects, since cultural meaning systems, as 
a special type of intersubjectively-shared information, have more than just representational 
functions, possessing a great deal of motivational-directive, affective, evoking and 
axiological-orientational force (D'Andrade and Strauss, 1992). Furthemore, cultural meaning 
systems work at many levels: they package information simultaneously about word and world 
(not just the real world, but also the ideal or unreal one), as well as about cognition, emotion 
and action. Their description therefore requires the integration of information about 
cognition, emotion, action and talk (from word through discourse to cultural models) in such 
a way that justice may be done to their representational, motivational, orientational, epistemic 
and axiological functions. From our standpoint, it is advisable for the linguist concerned with 
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the description and explanation of meaning systems to view language, cognition, emotion and 
action as interdependent and, therefore, to be accounted for in an integrated fashion. To this 
end, we favour a merging of cognitive linguistic and cognitive anthrological ideas, concepts 
and models. The basic t h s t  of this integration is twofold: that the way we "talk" is a 
projection of the way we "cognize" and "feel" (ie the way categorize things, objects, 
properties, events, etc., and they way we react to them); but, at the same time, that the way 
we cognize, feel and talk is for the most paa also contingent upon the way we "live" socially 
(ie the way we go about our daily individual and social lives, the tasks the social milieu sets 
to our minds and selves). 
From the theoretical cultural-cognitive model expounded above one may derive a 
number of more practica1 projects: cultural dictionaries, socio-cultural guides in pedagogic 
grammars, enthnographic descriptions, intercultural cornmunication and cultural studies, etc. 
In this paper we have outlined some of the notions from the model that might be involved 
in the specification of information for a (cross)cultural dictionary entry of World and Self 
concepts. 
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